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5A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO UNCONSCIONABLE SALES
CONTRACTS
Martin A. Frey *
Traditional contract law has provided the consumer with relief in
some of the more severe unconscionable contract situations; for exam-
ple, usury, fraud and duress. Unfortunately for the consumer, not all
unconscionable contracts come within established doctrines. Some sym-
pathetic courts have strained to give the consumer relief by construing
the contract language adversely to the merchant, by manipulating the
rules of offer and acceptance, and by determining the unconscionable
clause to be contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the
contract! The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code have supplied
the consumer with relief;2 under section 2-302, courts now can pass di-
rectly on the unconscionability of the contract or on a particular clause
in that contract.
Section 2-302 expressly authorizes the trial court to make a finding
as a matter of law that a contract or a contract clause was unconscion-
able at the time it was made. Upon this finding, the court may tailor
the contract to avoid the unconscionable result; it may refuse to enforce
the contract; or it may delete the unconscionable clause and enforce the
remainder of the contract.' At face value, this section seems a very po-
tent weapon in the consumer's arsenal when faced with a merchant
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.S.M.E. 1962, Northwestern University; J.D.
1965, Washington University; LL.M. 1966, George Washington University. I wish to thank Marilyn
Shell, Junior law student, Texas Tech University, for her skilled assistance in research.
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
2. The unconscionability doctrine of 2-302 is broad enough to encompass the traditional doc-
trines of usury, fraud and duress as well as those situations which were not within the established
doctrines. In application, however, the courts have shown a tendency to use the established doc-
trine when the facts so indicate rather than strike off into the uncharted sphere of 2-302. An ex-
ample is Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), aff'd, 108 N.J. Super.
129. 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970). The trial court held the installment sales contract unenforce-
able on two grounds: (1) fraud; and (2) unconscionability. The appellate court affirmed holding
'that the fraud ground was sufficient and therefore it was unnecessary to express an opinion on
unconscionability.
3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1. Unconscionability is a question
of law and must be determined by the court and not by the jury. Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Con-
tracting Co., 3 UCC. REP. SERV. 293, 296 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Butler County 1965), holding that it was
error for the Trial Court to submit the issue of unconscionability to the jury.
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof
may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence
as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
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armed with a form contract. But is it? When can a contract be attacked
as unconscionable? Are consumers in California under a severe disabil-
ity since their legislature deleted 2-302 from the California version of
the Code?
This article will not attempt to explore the history of 2-302; other
authors have labored at that task and their efforts are readily available.5
Nor will it prophesize on the future of this provision. Instead, this arti-
cle is written for the consumer's attorney. It is intended to supply him
with a check-list and guidelines for testing whether his client has a
possible case of unconscionability. Before getting to the check-lists,
however, it is necessary to take a moment to isolate the type of contract
that will be dealt with and to put unconscionability in its factual set-
ting.
The contracts under consideration involve the sale of goods by a
merchant to a consumer. Implicit is the fact that non-sale of goods
contracts will not be considered. This approach is consistent with the
formal scope of article 2 of the Code (Sales).6 The exclusion of non-sales
contracts does not mean that these contracts cannot be held unconscio-
nable under 2-302; the Code's influence extends far beyond its formal
scope, and some non-sales contracts have been held unconscionable.
5. E.g., Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 337 (1970);
Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121
(1967); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757 (1969); Leff, Unconscion-
ability and the Code--The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Leff, Uncon-
scionability and the Crowd--Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT L. REV. 349
(1970); Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969); Shulkin,
Unconscionability--The Code, The Court and The Consumer, 9 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 367
(1968); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969);
SpeidelUnconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970).
6. "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods...."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102. " 'Goods' means all things (including specially man-
ufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale. . . . Id. §
2-105(1). "In this Article unless the context otherwise requires 'contract' and 'agreement' are lim-
ited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. 'Contract for sale' includes both a
present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A 'sale' consists in the passing
of title from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-401)...."Id. § 2-106(1).
7. Contracts held unconscionable: Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Pratt, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 537, 278
A.2d 154 (1971) (lease agreement); American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435,
201 A.2d 886 (1964) (home improvement contract); Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324
N.Y.S. 2d 813 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1971) (enrollment agreement between a school and a stu-
dent); David v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 4 UCC REP. SERV. 1145 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Kings
County 1968) rev'd, 59 Misc. 2d 248, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 847 (App. T. 1969) (checking account con-
tract); cf In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (contract to advance money
against the assignment of accounts receivable). Contra, In re Advance Printing & Litho Co., 387
F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding that § 2-302 applies to sales but not to security transactions);
Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968) (holding that § 2-302 applies to
sales but not to security transactions); cf Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.
2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (in which an attempt to make the sales contract into a security agreement
failed). See also E.F. Lynch, Inc. v. Piccirilli, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 49 (Boston Mun. Ct. 1964) (lease
agreement: reversed because trial court failed to hold a hearing on unconscionability); United
States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apartments, Inc., 319 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County
1971) (lease agreement: plaintiffs motion for summary judgment denied because a hearing on the
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Their exclusion from this article means only that the results in these
cases may or may not be dictated by factors relevant to 2-302 and this,
at least in the first instance, may be misleading when isolating the
indicators for unconscionability under 2-302.
Contracts involving sales between merchants also will not be consi-
dered except for the following discussion on how to determine whether
the contract concerns a "consumer" or a "between merchants" sale.
The merchant is a person with special knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction." The "between mer-
chants" transaction occurs when both parties are chargeable with the
knowledge or skill of merchants.9 The indicators in a "between mer-
chants" case, because of knowledge and skill of both contracting
parties,may be slightly different from those in the consumer-merchant
situation and may instill a possible source of distortion, and therefore
are excluded from consideration.10
unconscionability issue was necessary); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. George Umbrella Co., 8 UCC
REP. SERV. 184 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1970) (lease agreement: reversed because trial court
failed to hold a hearing on unconscionability); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 UCC REP.
SERV. 1181 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1970) (lease agreement for coffee machines); Kaye v.
Coughlin, 443 S.W. 2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1969, no writ) (contract for sale of real es-
tate: no unconscionable provision).
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.108 is similar to UCC § 2-302 but is applicable to
consumer credit sales, consumer leases, and consumer loans. It provides:
(1) With respect to a consumer credit sale, consumer lease, or consumer loan, if
the court as a matter of law finds the agreement or any clause of the agreement to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the agreement, or it may enforce the remainder of the agreement without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the agreement or any clause there-
of may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a charge or practice expressly permitted by
this Act is not in itself unconscionable.
8. A "merchant" is defined by the Code to be "a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out
as having such knowledge or skill." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104(1).
9. Id. § 2-104(3).
10. Several illustrations of merchant-merchant cases are: County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding
& Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Romine, Inc. v. Savannah Steel Co., 117 Ga.
App. 353, 160 S.E.2d 659 (1968); Architectual Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495,
333 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1972); Division of Triple T. Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County 1969); Whitestone Credit
Corp. v. Barbory Realty Corp., S UCC REP. SERV. 176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Queens County 1968);
Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct.,
Suffolk County 1966); Central Ohio Co-op Milk Producers, Inc. v. Rowland, 29 Ohio App. 2d 236,
281 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
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It is important to note at this juncture that the cases that have
raised the unconscionability argument fall into several factual patterns.
The most common involves a merchant who has sold goods to a
consumer on a time payment contract. The consumer makes a number
of payments and then fails to make the next payment when due. The
merchant brings a contract action against the consumer for the balance
due or to recover the goods. The consumer answers by raising the
unconscionability of the price term as a defense to the contract action."
Under these same facts, the consumer need not wait for the mer-
chant to sue. The consumer may take the initiative. He could bring suit
against the merchant to reform the price term so that the contract sales
price (and service charges) would correlate to the price paid. By these
tactics, the consumer could retain the merchandise and free himself
from making further payments.2 While these two illustrations refer to
the unconscionability of the price term, other terms, as will be dis-
cussed later, may be unconscionable as well.
I. THE CHECK-LISTS
The text of the Code, by its silence in defining what are unconscio-
nable contracts and clauses, has led to uncertainty and speculation con-
cerning definition. A number of cases, by being merely conclusionary,
shed no light on the definition and its components.' A few other cases
do refer to definitions. Two similar yet different formulations currently
11. E.g., Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970); Jefferson
Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev d on the damage issue, 54 Misc.
2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967).
12. E.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Coun-
ty 1969).
13. E.g.. In re Jackson, Bankruptcy No. 40666, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 1152 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (title
retention provisions of a charge-all agreement for the entire amount was unconscionable); Dean v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 8 UCC REP. SERV. 1113 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1971) (dictum
stated that a clause not to assert defenses against an assignee and a clause providing a 5-day time
limit for claiming collateral in a repossessed automobile were unconscionable); Kosches v. Nichols,
327 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1971) (dictum stated that clauses limiting the right of the
consumer to move, or permiting the merchant to declare a default if the consumer dies or the mer-
chant with reasonable cause determines the goods to be in jeopardy, or giving the merchant the
right to enter a consumer's residence and seize the goods without a court order, may be uncon-
scionable); Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 66 Misc. 2d 974, 323 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County 1971)(credit contract not unconscionable);Paragon Homes of New England, Inc., v. Lang-
lois, 4 UCC REP. SERV. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1%7) (dictum stated that a clause specifying jurisdic-




are developing: one emanates from the comments to the Code and the
other from the pre-Code case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.14 In the following material these formulations will be isolated and
discussed separately and then brought together and compared for simi-
larities and differences.
A. The Comment 1 Formulation
The closest the Code comes to a definition for unconscionability is
in the comments to 2-302. Comment 1 provides the following circular
and somewhat obscure statement:
"The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks be-
cause of superior bargaining power." '
Based on this language and the cases which will be discussed subse-
quently, the following check-list for unconscionability can be devel-
oped:
1. Identify the one-sided clause. This will be a term for which the
merchant is bargaining.
2. Identify the general commercial background (also known as the
commercial setting) at the time of the contracting. Include facts about
this contract and related contracts and dealings between the parties.
3. Identify the commercial needs of the particular trade or case at
the time of contracting. Include facts which explain or tend to justify
the merchant's position regarding the one-sided clause.
14. 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970), refers
to neither Comment 1 nor Walker-Thomas. Instead it refers to the following passage in Carter v.
Boone County Trust Co., 338 Mo. 629, 92 S.W.2d 647, 657 (1936), which appears in WORDS
AND PHRASES. An unconscionable contract has been defined as:
one such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other. To what extent in-
adequacy of consideration must go to make a contract unconscionable is difficult to
state, except in abstract terms, which gives but little practical help. It has been said
that there must be an inequality so strong, gross, and manifest that it must be im-
possible to state it to a man of common sense without producing an exclamation at
the inequality of it.
In Toker, a price term with a price-value disparity of 2.2 or more to 1 was held to be unconscion-
able.
15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1. For criticism of this test, see J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 116 (1972).
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4. Evaluate the one-sidedness of the clause in the light of the gener-
al commercial background and the commercial needs of the trade or
case. Was the clause a product of the merchant's oppressive practices
and, if so, would the clause shock the conscience of the court?
Based on the limited number of consumer-merchant sales cases
which have discussed Comment 1,16 the following materials develop and
illustrate the check-list's rough guidelines. The first, and probably the
simplest step, is the identification of those clauses that the consumer
will claim to be one-sided in favor of the merchant. These are the claus-
es for which the merchant was bargaining. Illustrative are price terms,
conditions precedent to warranties, waivers of defenses, and title reten-
tion provisions.
Next, identify the general commercial background at the time of
contracting. The commercial background or commercial setting should
include the events leading up to the contracting, and will help to ex-
plain how and why the one-sided term found its way into the contract.
For example, in Frostifresh Corp. v. ReynosoU the contract for the re-
frigerator-freezer was negotiated orally in Spanish between the
consumers and a Spanish speaking salesman representing the mer-
chant. In that conversation the consumer husband told the salesman
that he had but one week left on his job and he could not afford to buy
the appliance. The salesman distracted and deluded the consumers by
advising them that the appliance would cost them nothing because they
would be paid bonuses or commissions of $25 each on the numerous
sales that would be made to their neighbors and friends. Thereafter the
consumers signed a retail installment contract entirely in English, which
was neither translated nor explained to them. In that contract there
was a cash sales price of $900 and a credit charge of $245.88, making a
total of $1145.88. The refrigerator-freezer cost the merchant $348.
The commercial background need not be limited to the one contract
in which the one-sided term appears. It may include related contracts
and dealings between the parties. If the consumer desires to go beyond
the one contract, then he must supply facts which show that this extrin-
sic material is relevant. Milford Finance Corp. v. Lucas presents an ex-
cellent illustration of the expansion of the scope of the general com-
mercial background beyond the single contract in question. In Milford
16. Milford Fin. Corp. v. Lucas, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App. Div. 1970) (Judgment fo,
merchant's assignee reversed since the trial court erred in excluding evidence of commercial back-
ground relevant to the decision of unconscionability); Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522,
198 N.W.2d 57 (1972); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967).
17. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966).
18. 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App. Div. 1970).
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Finance the consumers (husband and wife), in response to a post card
informing them that they had "won a free Miami Beach vacation for
two," called a telephone number to redeem the vacation. They were
subsequently visited by a salesman for Northeast Food Service. He
inquired how much they spent each week on meat for the family and if
they might be interested in a frozen food plan. He stated that Northeast
would supply them with the finest choice of meats delivered to their
home for $12 per week, or 200 per week more than they had been pay-
ing. The consumers asked how often the meats were delivered and were
told every six months. When they said that the freezer section of their
refrigerator was not capable of holding such a large quantity of food,
the salesman said that if they agreed to purchase frozen meat from
Northeast for three years, they would be supplied a freezer at no extra
charge.
The salesman presented the consumers with a Northeast Food Ser-
vice Membership Bond and Guarantee and then produced two docu-
ments which he requested the consumers to execute. One was entitled
"consumer note" and was in the amount of $195.24, payable in four
equal payments of $48.81. The other was the retail installment sales
agreement in the amount of $1,050.84 payable in 36 equal payments of
$29.19. When the consumers saw the latter they said it was too much to
pay for a freezer. The salesman said the freezer payments were inclu-
ded in the food payments and both amounted to $12 per week. The
salesman said the only reason that they were required to sign the retail
installment sales agreement was to insure that they purchased their
meats from Northeast for at least three years. The consumers subse-
quently paid $624 ($12 x 52 weeks) and received one year's supply of
meat. Northeast then went out of business and no further meat deliver-
ies were made.
In the interim, the installment sales agreement had been assigned
from Northeast to Milford Finance. When the consumers did not re-
ceive deliveries, they refused to make any further payments and re-
quested that Milford Finance remove the freezer. Milford, as assignee
of the freezer contract, brought action against the consumers for the
unpaid balance. The consumers contended that the total time sales
price of $1,050.84 was so excessively high as to make the entire retail
installment sales agreement unconscionable and unenforceable. From
Milford Finance it may be seen that evidence is relevant to expand the
scope of the hearing from the one contract being challenged to include




In Milford Finance, the following acts demonstrated that the scope
should be expanded. The post card which informed the consumers that
they had "won a free Miami Beach vacation for two"; the subsequent
visit by a salesman for Northeast; the lead into the frozen food plan;
the signing of the note, bond and guarantee and the sales agreement,
all on the same day; and the fact that the food was a necessary require-
ment of the freezer contract, demonstrated that the contract for the
freezer was an integral part of the food contract. The evidence sur-
rounding the manner in which the consumers were induced to sign up
for the food service and for the purchase of the freezer was admissible,
to show that the freezer payments were included in the food payments.
The evidence concerning the Northeast Food Service Membership Bond
and guarantee was introduced to show that Northeast's agent was not
merely selling a freezer unit to the consumers, but also that he had
made certain representations about a frozen food plan, upon which
representations the consumers had relied. Once the scope was
expanded, evidence surrounding the manner in which the consumers
were induced to become involved with any aspect of the whole transac-
tion was relevant to show that the merchant had engaged in deceptive
practices during the negotiation of the freezer contract. Finally, the fact
that the consumers paid the monthly payments up until the time that
they were unable to procure any more food demonstrated their good
faith.
Next, identify the commercial needs of the particular trade or case
at the time of contracting. These facts will be used to explain the mer-
chant's position regarding the one-sided clause. Are there facts that
justify such a clause? Consider, for example, the commercial needs that
influence the setting of the ultimate price to the consumer. Included
are the net cost of the goods to the merchant, a reasonable profit, com-
missions to be paid to salesmen, possible collection and legal fees,
trucking and service charges necessarily incurred, reasonable finance
charges, and other matters of overhead. 9
Finally, evaluate the one-sidedness of the clauses in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the trade
or case. Was the clause so one-sided at the time of contracting as to be
unconscionable? Comment 1 states that a finding of unconscionability
will lie only when it is necessary to prevent oppression and unfair sur-
prise. While this language is conjunctive -- "oppression and unfair
19. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967).
12 [Vol. II:5
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suprise" -- the cases refer only to oppression and thus treat the terms as
disjunctive.0
Most cases provide little help in evaluating whether a clause is so
one-sided as to be unconscionable" Of the few that have referred to the
Comment 1 formulation, some have been cases where the trial court
has erroneously excluded evidence relevant to the unconscionability
finding, and therefore are of little help in pinpointing unconscionability.
Two cases, Melcher v. Boesch Motor Cof2and Frostifresh v. Reynoso, do
shed some light on the application of the Comment 1 formulation. In
Melcher, a consumer purchased a new pickup truck from a dealer.
From the beginning, the truck used an abnormal amount of oil. When
it had been driven nearly 25,000 miles, it threw a connecting rod and
destroyed the engine. The consumer brought action against the dealer
and the manufacturer for damages for breach of the manufacturer's
express warranty that the vehicle was free from defects in material and
workmanship. The dealer and the manufacturer defended on the
ground that the consumer had failed to comply with the conditions pre-
cedent to the warranty -- that is, the service requirements and the re-
quired certification of such compliance. The consumer replied that he
had performed the required maintenance and that the requirement that
he obtain from the dealer a certification of compliance was unconscion-
able and unreasonable and therefore unenforceable.
After quoting the Comment 1 formulation, the court held that the
certification requirement was not unconscionable. It must be
emphasized that the court found the requirement not unconscionable,
not by discussing whether it was "oppressive" or led to "unfair sur-
prise", but instead by whether it was "unreasonable." In finding the
basis for the certification clearly reasonable, the court noted that the
requirement of a consumer that he maintain the engine of his vehicle
properly, in exchange for a warranty that the vehicle be free of defect in
material and workmanship at time of delivery, go hand-in-hand. Also,
the required certification did not put the manufacturer and the dealer
in the position of sole arbiters as to what is sufficient maintenance. The
manufacturer and the dealer did not have the unqualified right under
the clause to refuse the certification and defeat the consumer's claim.
20. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966). For a dis-
cussion of "unfair surprise" and "oppression," see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES 710-12 (1973).
21. Milford Fin. Corp. v. Lucas, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App. Div. 1970) (Based on the
discussion on appeal, the unconscionability decision would appear to hinge on the merchant's de-
ceptive practices versus the consumer's good faith).
22. Supra note 16.
1974]1 13
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While the consumer must furnish the dealer with evidence of perfor-
mance of the required maintenance services, the dealer may not unrea-
sonably withhold the certification. If the manufacturer and the dealer
could arbitrarily refuse to recognize the fact that the service was pro-
perly performed and thus deny the certification, the certification re-
quirement would be unreasonable and the condition precedent that the
consumer obtain the certification would be waived. Thus construed, the
certification provision is not unreasonable.
While the Melcher contract was not unconscionable, the Frostifresh
contract was. Frostifresh provides the following clue to unconscionabil-
ity: It is not oppression alone, according to the Comment 1 formula-
tion, that causes a contract to be unconscionable. If it were, then the
problem would seem to revert to a reallocation of the risk, which Com-
ment 1 expressly rejects. Instead, it is oppression that shocks the con-
science of the court. In Frostifresh, the court noted that the service
charge ($245.88), which almost equalled the price of the refrigerator-
freezer ($348), was in and of itself indicative of the oppression which
was practiced on the consumers. In addition, the consumers were
handicapped by a lack of knowledge both as to the commercial situa-
tion and as to the nature and terms of the contract, which was submit-
ted in a language foreign to them. These oppressive practices led the
court to conclude that the contract was "too hard a bargain". The sale
of the appliance at the contract price was shocking to the conscience of
the court. The conscience of the court would not permit the enforce-
ment of the contract as written?
B. The Walker-Thomas Formulation
The more commonly cited formulation, emanating from the case of
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., defines unconscionability
as including an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable
to the other party.4 The following check-list directs attention to the rele-
vant factors:
1. The consumer must have had a meaningful choice at the time of
contracting.
a. The consumer must have had a reasonable opportunity to
understand the contract terms. An important term must not have been
hidden in a maze of fine print; nor must an important term have been
23. Frostifresh v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966); cf Star Credit
Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1969) (consumer failed
to submit evidence of the freezer's actual value, which made a determination of the unconscion-
ability of the price term impossible).
24. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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obscured by deceptive sales practices; nor must the consumer have
been denied the opportunity to understand the term due to a lack of
education or some other disability.
b. In addition, the consumer must have had the power to bar-
gain about the term. He must not have lacked the power to shop com-
paratively due to limited financial resources or because all merchants
dealing in the desired item uniformly use the same commercial form or
charge the same price.
c. If the consumer lacked a meaningful choice at the time of
contracting, then an inequality of bargaining power existed. However,
only a gross inequality of bargaining power will constitute the requisite
absence of meaningful choice. Was the inequality of bargaining power
gross?
2. The merchant must not have taken advantage of the customer's
absence of meaningful choice by including a term unreasonably favor-
able to himself in the contract.
a. Identify the favorable term. This will be a term for which the
merchant is bargaining.
b. Identify the circumstances that existed at the time of con-
tracting. Did these circumstances make the favorable term unreason-
ably favorable to the merchant? Specifically, did the merchant know-
ingly take advantage of the consumer's absence of meaningful choice?
Considering only the consumer's evidence of circumstances, does this
advantage appear unreasonable? Were there commercial needs for the
particular trade or case that justified the merchant in including into the
contract what appeared to be an unreasonably favorable term? If the
advantage appears unreasonable and there are no commercial needs
that justify the merchant's position, then the term is unconscionable.
The following materials develop and illustrate the rough guidelines
of the check-list: (1) For unconscionability, the consumer must lack a
meaningful choice at the time of contracting. (2) Whether a meaningful
choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by consi-
dering all the circumstances surrounding the transaction.5 (3) Meaning-
ful choice is directly related to bargaining power, and bargaining power
is a composite of knowing what to bargain for and the ability to
bargain for it.
The consumer, when signing the contract, must at least have had a
reasonable opportunity to know and understand its terms. This
25. Id. The consumer is entitled to a hearing to present evidence as to the commercial setting.Therefore, the merchant is not entitled to a summary judgment. Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez,53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. County 1967).
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opportunity may not exist if the important terms are hidden in a maze
of fine print, or if they are minimized or obscured by deceptive sales
practices. An example of the latter occurred in Toker v. Perl,' where
the merchant's salesman arrived at the consumer's home for a prear-
ranged appointment. For the first two and one-half hours of the three
hour interview, the discussion centered around food plans that could be
arranged by the merchant. No mention was made of a freezer. Some-
time within the last one-half hour, when it became apparent that the
plan called for the purchase of 18 weeks of food at a time, the
consumers mentioned that they had no facilities to store such a large
quantity of food. The salesman replied that a freezer was included in
the food plan. Following the explanation of the food plan, the salesman
presented three forms for signing. He informed the consumers that the
documents were for 18 weeks of food. The forms were placed one on
top of the other, leaving visible only the signature line on the lower two
forms. The top page was the food plan contract. The next day when the
consumers examined the papers, they discovered that in addition to the
food plan they had signed a financing application and an installment
contract for a freezer.
The opportunity to understand the terms may not exist when the
consumer suffers from a lack of education or a language barrier. For
example, a Spanish-speaking consumer, with at best a sketchy know-
ledge of the English language, may neither know nor understand when
he signs a contract printed entirely in English that he is waiving all
implied warranties, despite the fact that the waiver is printed in the
contract in large black type." At times even a consumer with a sound
basic education and without language problems may be unable to
understand the contract even if he reads it, due to the drafting skill of
the merchant's form writer.' In either case, the consumer who signs the
contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, signs without choice.'
A "smart" consumer knows and understands what is in the con-
tract. But what terms can this consumer get? Is the consumer free to
indulge in comparative shopping? The answer may be that he is
physically able but, due to his very limited financial resources' or the
fact that all merchants dealing in the desired items uniformly use
the same commercial form, or charge the same price," comparative
26. 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), affd on other grounds, 108 N.J. Super.
129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970).
27. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
28. Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971).
29. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
30. Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972), Jones v. Star Credit
Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
31. Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971).
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shopping is not practiced. Or, the consumer may be physically able to
shop comparatively, but be psychologically unable to do so because the
merchant calls on the consumer in the consumer's own home.3 Without
the power to do effective comparison shopping, the consumer has little
bargaining power, little real choice.
Only a gross inequality of bargaining power will constitute the re-
quisite absence of meaningful choice.3 Although our research did not
uncover a case which defined the distinction between gross and
less-than-gross inequality of bargaining power, some guidance can be
gleaned from the ultimate conclusions of the courts on the unconscion-
ability issue. It appears from these cases that only one of the factors
from the check-list is necessary for the inequality of bargaining power
to be gross. 4 If more than one factor is present at the time of contract-
ing, all the better. What is critical is the severity of the inequality de-
veloped within that factor. Showings of deceptive sales practices, lan-
guage barriers, and limited financial resources have been sufficient to
support conclusions of unconscionability; but it appears that the psych-
ological factor of being trapped by a salesman in one's own home is not
strong enough by itself to be relied upon to show gross inequality, and
should only be used in conjunction with another factor to strengthen
that other factor.
Absence of meaningful choice alone will not warrant a finding of
unconscionability. Absence of meaningful choice is only one-half of the
two-pronged Walker-Thomas test. For a clause to be unconscionable,
the merchant must knowingly have taken advantage of the consumer's
absence of meaningful choice by including in the contract a term
unreasonably favorable to the seller.
Was the term favorable to the merchant? Illustrative are such terms
as waiver of implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a
particular purpose, acceleration clauses, and price terms. The mer-
chant benefits at the consumer's expense.
A term favorable to the merchant does not automatically make the
term unconscionable. Freedom to contract permits and encourages
32. See Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Toker v.
Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), affd on other grounds, 108 N.J. Super. 129,
260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970).
33. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Jones v. Star
Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
34. In Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), the price term was found
unconscionable since it had been obscured by deceptive sales practices. In Jefferson Credit Corp.
v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969), the waiver of warranties was found
unconscionable because the consumer was denied the opportunity to understand the waiver clause
due to a lack of education in English. In Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d
264 (Sup. Ct. 1969), the price term was held unconscionable as the consumer, a welfare recipient,
had only very limited financial resources.
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each contracting party to bargain for terms most favorable to himself.
The limitation (in addition to good faith)3s is that circumstances must
not exist at the time of contracting which would make the favorable
term unreasonably favorable to the merchant. In determining reason-
ableness or fairness of the terms, the primary concern must be with the
terms of the contract considered in light of the circumstances existing
when the contract was made. Existing circumstances encompass the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the parti-
cular trade.or case." Did the merchant knowingly take advantage of the
consumer's absence of meaningful choice?3 The merchant knowingly
takes advantage when he leads the consumer to believe that his signa-
ture to a contract is not for the purchase of merchandise, when in fact
it is. 8 Knowingly taking advantage may be implied when a merchant,
dealing at arms length with the consumer who has a severe language
barrier, fails to explain the terms favorable to the merchant so the con-
sumer can understand. Or it may be implied from the price-value dis-
parity when the merchant knows that the consumer's limited financial
resources make it impossible for him to buy from others.
Considering only the consumer's evidence of circumstances, does
the advantage gained by the merchant appear unreasonable? In Jones
v. Star Credit Corp.," a price-term case, the court considered whether
the mathematical price-value disparity was exhorbitant on its face and
concluded that it was oppressive. The court then used the language that
the price imposed on these consumers for this appliance shocked the
conscience of the court. This occurred when the price-value disparity
was in excess of 2.5 to 1.
Commercial needs provide the merchant with an opportunity to
justify the existence of favorable terms. When the challenged term is
price, the merchant's defense may be based on the necessity and even
the desirability of installment sales and the extension of credit. There
are many, including but not necessarily limited to the poorest members
35. The Code provides that "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-203. This
obligation of good faith underpins the entire Code. The consumer's obligation of good faith means
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Id. § 1-201(19). The merchant has a
higher obligation. "'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." Id. § 2-103(lXb).
36. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
37. Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59
Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1969).
38. Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968), affd on other grounds, 108
N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970).
39. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); accord, Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d
78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) (2.2-2.5 to 1); Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div.
1968) (2.7 to 1). Contra, Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1971) (2.5 to 1 was not unconscionable).
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of the community, who would be deprived of even the most basic con-
veniences without the use of these devices. Similarly, the retail mer-
chant selling on installment or extending credit is expected to establish
a pricing factor which will afford a degree of protection commensurate
with the risk of selling to those who might be default-prone." In addi-
tion, mark-ups vary from industry to industry. A high mark-up in one
industry might be low in anotherY To be successful in his unconscion-
ability claim, a consumer must know the mores and business practices
of the time and place or the merchant may readily justify his favorable
term.
C. A Comparison
The Comment I and the Walker-Thomas formulations are similar
in that both focus on the term favorable to the merchant. Under both,
the favorable term must be considered in light of the circumstances
existing at the time of contracting that would make the favorable term
so oppressive or unreasonably favorable to the merchant that the con-
science of the court is shocked. In both, the merchant is given an op-
portunity to present evidence of the circumstances that would justify his
inclusion into the contract of what appears to be an oppressive or un-
reasonably favorable term.
The difference between the formulations is that the Comment 1 test
appears to end with what already has been said. The Walker-Thomas
test adds a second area of consideration which must be considered even
before the favorable term: There must be an absence of meaningful
choice. The merchant, when including the unreasonably favorable term
must have done so in the spirit of knowingly taking advantage of the
consumer's lack of meaningful choice. Therefore, in comparison, the
Walker-Thomas test appears more restrictive.
What significance does this have for the consumer who is attempt-
ing to raise a defense of unconscionability? Based on the limited num-
40. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1%9); accord, Toker
v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970) (less overhead due to door-to-door salesmen and
no showroom or store).
41. Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971). Before a
merchant is required to divulge his pricing policies through interrogatories or through the produc-
tion of records in court, the consumer must assert his claim with some degree of detail. Patterson
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1972),
gives some pointers in the warranty area:
There is obviously a point at which the warranty limitation must be considered un-
conscionable--for example if, due to defective manufacture or failure to repair by
failing to place a 25 cent nut on the proper bolt, the brakes fail and a collision oc-
curs resulting in heavy property damage and personal injury, courts might well be
loath to limit the manufacturer's or seller's liability to the sum of twenty five cents.
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ber of reported decisions, the choice of tests does not appear to be juris-
dictional. The same courts have used both formulations on different
occasions.2 Nor does the choice appear to be based on the type of term
being challenged. Both tests have been used for price terms43 and for
non-price terms."
Does this mean that there is only one test -- a test which requires
the merchant to have included the unreasonably favorable term in the
spirit of knowingly taking advantage of the consumer's lack of mean-
ingful choice? Based on the three cases that have used the Comment 1
test, all would come to the same result under Walker-Thomas. In
Milford Finance, the food plan/freezer case, the consumers lacked a
meaningful choice at the time of contracting since the price term was
obscured by deceptive sales practices. In Frostifresh Corp., the refriger-
ator-freezer case, the consumers lacked a meaningful choice at the time
of contracting since they could not understand the contract terms due
to a lack of education. In Melcher, the automobile warranty case, the
consumer lacked a meaningful choice since he did not have the power
to do comparison shopping, due to the fact that all merchants dealing
in the desired item uniformly used the same commercial form. Unlike
the other two cases, the advantage gained by the merchant in Melcher
was not unreasonable under the circumstances. The certification, which
was the condition precedent to the validity of the warranty, could not
be denied arbitrarily.
The consumer would be well advised to plead and prove both
absence of meaningful choice and unreasonable terms's This will avoid
the consumer's predicament in Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
42. New York Supreme Court, Nassau County: compare Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.
2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Comment 1 formulation) with Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,
59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (Walker-Thomas formulation).
43. Comment 1 formulation: Milford Fin. Corp. v. Lucas, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 801 (Mass. App.
Div. 1970); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966). Wal-
ker- Thomas formulation: Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1971); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Toker
v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (L. Div. 1968).
44. Comment 1 formulation: Melcher v. Boesch Motor Co., 188 Neb. 522 (1972) (condition pre-
cedent to the validity of a warranty). Walker-Thomas formulation: Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Mar-
cano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (waiver of implied warranty); Urdang v.
Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971) (acceleration clause).
45. Unconscionability, when used as an affirmative defense, must be pleaded by the defendent.
Asco Mining Co. v. Gross Contracting Co., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 293, 296 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Butler
County 1965). A sufficient factual predicate for the defense must be alleged before wholesale dis-
covery will be allowed. An unsupported conclusory allegation in the answer that a contract is un-
enforceable as unconscionable is not enough. Sufficient facts which surround the commercial set-
ting of the contract at the time it was made should be alleged so that the court may form a judg-
ment as to the existence of a valid claim of unconscionability and the extent to which discovery of
evidence to support that claim should be allowed. Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277
A.2d 111, 114 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (the answer asserted the affirmative defense of unconscion-
ability only on the basis of a stated conclusion that the price was excessive--held insufficient).
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*Co. There the consumer alleged only the unreasonable term. The court
held that without alleging absence of meaningful choice, the allegations
were insufficient to state a claim of unconscionability.
II. THE CONSUMER'S POSITION IN CALIFORNIA: CAN
THERE BE PROTECTION FROM UNCONSCIONABILITY
WITHOUT LEGISLATION?
Section 2-302 of the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial
Code was omitted from the California version?7 A California State Bar
Committee explained that the decision to delete was based on the belief
that giving courts unqualified power to strike down terms they might
consider unconscionable could result in the renegotiation of contracts
in every case of disagreement with the fairness of the provisions the
parties had accepted."
Are the California consumers severely hampered by the legislature's
rejection of 2-302 -- action which prevents the California courts from
ruling openly on unconscionability? Naturally, the deletion of 2-302
may dictate that the courts will proceed with caution when faced with a
situation which requires an expansion of their power. On the other
hand, the courts need not refrain from doing what they have been do-
ing, or from taking advantage of the provisions in the Code which have
not been deleted. Case law exists in California that indicates uncon-
scionability, as a public policy doctrine, was a part of California's com-
mon law prior to the legislature's adoption of the Code.9
46. 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); accord, Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co.,
280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), affd, 8 UCC REP. SERV. 321 (D.C. Gen Sess. 1970). It should
be noted that these cases are from the District of Columbia, the same jurisdiction as Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. This may explain the court's precision concerning the allegation
and proof of an absence of meaningful choice.
47. CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2302 (West 1964). North Carolina originally deleted § 2-302
from its version of the UCC. N. CAR. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (1965); Clifford, Article Two: Sales,
44 N. CAR. L. REV. 539, 562-64 (1966). In 1971, North Carolina added it back. N. CAR. GEN.
STAT. § 25-2-302 (Supp. 1971). Louisiana has not enacted the Code. All other states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have § 2-302.
48. California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, A Special Report, The Uniform
Commercial Code, 37 CAL. B. J. 117, 135-36 (1962). § 2-302 was defended on the ground that
form contracts were not negotiated in any real sense and therefore the courts must have the power
to prevent the merchant from overreaching when dealing with a consumer who has neither the
knowledge nor the bargaining position to influence the contract terms. Id. at 135. A compromise
to place some limitations on the court's power by requiring the contract to be a form contract and
by excluding the "between merchants" situations (since they presumably are of more equal bar-
gaining power) failed. See CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2302, Cal. Code Comment at 197-98(West 1964); Project, A Comparison of California Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1087, 1130-32 (1963).
49. Swanson v. Hempstead, 64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 149 P.2d 404, 407-08 (1964) (the evidence did
not justify a finding that the attorney's contingent fee contract was unconscionable); accord,
Setzer v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 2d 213, 368 P.2d 124, 18 Cal. Rptr. 524, 527 (1962); Youngblood v.
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While the legislature has expressly excluded 2-302, the fears that
premised its exclusion have not proven correct. The courts in other
states have not run roughshod over negotiated contract rights. This,
then, would give the courts some leeway to continue to follow their
common law unconscionability doctrine. In addition, there seems to be
no reason why the courts could not pattern their common law uncon-
scionability doctrine after that emanating from 2-302. Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., the leading case in the area, was itself a
pre-Code common law unconscionability casey The impact of the exis-
tence of the doctrine, while not dramatic under the restrictive Walker-
Thomas formulation, would be something that could be useful to the
consumer, at least in limited cases.
Besides this frontal attempt to incorporate 2-302 into California
law, there are more subtle approaches. For example, California courts
have, by construction and interpretation of contract terms, avoided en-
forcement of harsh bargainsO They also have manipulated the rules of
offer, acceptance and consideration to reach pro-consumer results?2 An-
other approach is the recognition of unconscionability as an aspect of
good faith -- a concept that has not been deleted in California and
Higgins, 146 Cal. App. 2d 350, 303 P.2d 637, 639 (1956). The Swanson case defined an "uncon-
.scionable contract" as one "such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make on
the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other." Swanson v. Hempstead,
64 Cal. App. 2d 681, 149 P.2d 404, 407 (1964). Authority exists for the premise that § 2-302 codi-
-fies the common law doctrine of unconscionability. In re Jackson, Bankruptcy No. 40666, 9 UCC
REP. SERV. (W.D. Mo. 1971); American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964) (construction contract); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405, 418 (1967).
50. Although the Code (including § 2-302) had been adopted in the District of Columbia at the
time of litigation, it was not enacted until after Williams had contracted. This, the time of con-
tracting, was the critical time for determining whether the Code applied. Therefore the Code did
not control the decision. The Walker-Thomas court looked to legislative history (i.e., Congress'
enactment of the Code and § 2-302) and held that this was the way it ought, at common law, to be.
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
51. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041, 1047 (1954) (strict construc-
tion of a disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantable quality).
52. E.g., Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) (estoppel); State Fin. Co. v.
Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941) (gross inequality of consideration was evidence of
fraud). Corbin stated:
There is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, and
undue influence, not to mention differences in economic bargaining power, to enable
the courts to avoid enforcement of a bargain that is shown to be unconscionable by
reason of gross inadequacy of consideration accompanied by other relevant factors.
1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 128 (1963). (footnote omitted)
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which underpins the entire Code. While achieving results by direction
rather than by indirection is desirable, the legislature's rejection of
2-302 has left the consumer and the courts with little alternative..
CONCLUSION
The consumer-merchant relationship in the sale of goods area has
not been greatly affected by 2-302. Only a few reported cases illustrate
that the consumer has been benefited by 2-302. Unconscionability,
under the Walker-Thomas formulation, works little magic for the
consumer. The Comment 1 formulation, while appearing to be more
readily available to the consumer, may in fact contain (although not
verbalized) the same considerations as those found in Walker-Thomas.
On the other hand, unconscionability does play an important role in
those cases which do not fit the established doctrine -- such as fraud,
duress and usury -- but which are still so oppressive as to shock the
conscience of the court.
One final point needs some reflection. For a consumer who can
establish that the contract or clause was unconscionable at the time of
contracting, some care must be taken in selecting his remedy. For ex-
ample, where the price term is unconscionable, does the consumer want
53. For a discussion of good faith, see note 35 supra. An unconscionable contract is inconsis-
tent with good faith. In re Jackson, Bankruptcy No. 40666, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 1152, 1158 (W.D.
Mo. 1971). "While the unconscionability referred to in § 2-302 may be conduct worse in some de-
gree than the lack of good faith prohibited by § 1-203, both impose the same basic obligations of
fair dealing in commercial transactions." Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397, 401
(1971).
California has not deleted all reference to unconscionability. See CAL. COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2719(3) (West 1964).
54. See CAL. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2302, Cal. Code Comment 197 (West 1964). For further
details concerning California, see Comment, A Reevaluation of the Decision Not To Adopt the
Unconscionability Provision of the Uniform Commercial Code in California, 7 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 289 (1970). It should be noted that California does have consumer protection legislation. For
a discussion see Project, Legislative Regulation of Retail Installment Financing, 7 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 618 (1960).
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to return the goods and get his money back, keep the goods and pay
what they are worth, or keep the goods and not pay any more (which
already may be more than the goods are worth)? Failure to position
himself properly before litigation may mean that a finding of uncon-
scionability may not have the potency for the consumer that it could
have had. He will not get his full measure of relief.ss
55. In the price cases, if the consumer returns the goods, he may be able to get his money back.
On the other hand, if he keeps the goods, he may find himself paying what it was worth or possibly
more. This may depend on the amount already paid. For example, in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso,
54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967), reversing on the damage issue, 52 Misc. 2d 26,
274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), the consumer had paid only the down payment of $32. He did
not attempt to return the refrigerator-freezer. The cost to the merchant was $348 and the cash
sales price was $900 plus charges bringing the total to $1145.88. The trial court held the price
term unconscionable and gave the merchant judgment for $348 (his cost) with interest, less the $32
(paid by consumer). The appeals court reversed the damage issue (still held unconscionable) but
permitted the merchant to recover more (merchant should recover his net cost for the appliance
plus a reasonable profit, in addition to trucking and service charges necessarily incurred and rea-
sonable finance charges).
In Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County
1969), the consumer did not ask for a set-off and thus paid more for his freezer than did the con-
sumer in Frostifresh. The maximum retail value (including a reasonable profit margin) was $300.
The consumer had paid $619.88 on a contract which called for a cash sales price of $900 and a
total price of $1234.80. The court said that the merchant had already been amply compensated
and reformed the price term to coincide with the amount paid. Should the consumer have been
entitled to a refund of $319.88 (the difference between what he paid and the maximum retail value
including a reasonable profit margin) less a reasonable finance charge? The additional amount the
consumer paid ($319) was still more than the entire difference between total price and the cash
sales price. Accord, Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1970); cf Urdang v. Muse,
114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971).
